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1 Introduction.
The Italian public debt is currently around 125 percent of GDP. Italy is not the only OECD
country with a very high debt; however, several other high debt countries, such as Denmark
and Ireland, have implemented rather swift and successful fiscal adjustments in the mid
eighties. On the contrary, the Italian timid adjustment started by the Amato government
has not stopped the growth of the debt/GDP ratio.
A recent academic literature has investigated which politico-institutional factors can
explain the large variance of fiscal policy experiences in the OECD countries in the 80's.
1
 One factor which has been emphasized is budget institutions, namely all the rules and
regulations according to which budgets are drafted, approved and implemented. In fact,
recent work by von Hagen (1992) and Von Hagen and Harden (1994) suggests that different
procedures are associated with different budget outcomes.
Given this background, it is very natural to ask the question of whether budget pro-
cedures have contributed to the current conditions of Italian public finances and whether
these procedures can be improved. This is in fact the question which we address.
One of the main arguments of this paper is that complexity, lack of transparency, and
convoluted laws and regulations make it very difficult to handle the Italian public finances
and make debt reduction policies particularly difficult. On the contrary, this complexity
and lack of transparency make it easy to engage in creative budgeting, allow overexpansion
on the spending side, and obfuscate the level and distribution of the tax burden on the
revenue side.
In our view, it is unrealistic to expect that an appropriate budget procedure can elim-
inate permanently all bad accounting habits. A government, or a parliament, that are
determined to run a loose fiscal policy will always be able to do so. However, a budget
procedure can do two things:
1) make it possible for responsible governments or parliaments to run fiscal policy in a clear
and transparent way;
2) make it more difficult for irresponsible governments or parliaments to hide their irre-
sponsibility.
In our view, the way to attain these goals is not more regulation of an already convoluted
system, but a simpler and more structured process. Thus, we make several proposals
that aim at simplifying the preparation, presentation and discussion of the various budget
documents. The goal is to make it easier to detect and allocate the blame for irresponsible
fiscal behavior. A second set We also make a set of proposals aimed at reinforcing the role
of the Treasury minister within the executive, and of the executive relative to Parliament.
1See Alesina and Perotti (1995a,b) for surveys.
The goal of this second set of proposals is to entrust the process to the agent that normally
has the best information and incentives to enforce fiscal discipline.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews some theoretical, academic liter-
ature which provides some intellectual points of reference for the discussion which follows.
Section 3 identifies what in our views are the most important areas in which the Italian
budget procedures can be improved, and presents our proposals. Section 4 discusses the
lessons from a fascinating recent fiscal reform in New Zealand. Section 5 briefly discusses
two recent proposals of reform of the Italian budget procedures. Section 6 concludes.
2 Budget Institutions: Theory.
One can distinguish between two types of budget institutions: 2 laws that prescribe targets
on the budget, such as balanced budget laws, and procedural rules.
2.1 Balanced Budget Laws.
Two theoretical arguments suggest that a balanced budget law would not be optimal. The
first one is related to stabilization policies. Standard Keynesian anti-cyclical policies pre-
scribe tax cuts, expenditure increases, and deficits during recessions, and tax increases,
expenditure cuts, and surpluses during economic expansions. 3 A second theoretical ar-
gument which runs against the balanced budget law idea is the tax smoothing theory of
budget deficits (Barro (1979), Lucas and Stokey (1983)). According to this theory, budget
deficits and surpluses should be used to "smooth" the distortionary cost of taxation, so
that deficits should be permitted when spending is exceptionally and temporarily high, for
instance during wars, natural calamities, emergencies etc., or when revenues are temporar-
ily low, for instance during recessions. Thus, a law that prescribes a balanced budget in
every year would excessively constrain the use of budget deficits and surpluses as the buffer
needed to implement the optimal tax smoothing policy.
Theoretically, one could think of a 'contingent' balanced budget law, with escape clauses
to permit a certain amount of tax smoothing. However, a well understood argument in the
debate on rules vs. discretion' suggests that rules have to be simple. Complicated rules can
easily be circumvented and present monitoring problems, so that in the end they become
almost useless.
On the other hand, several arguments suggest that actual policies are not dictated
2This section is largely based on sections 1 and 3 of Alesina and Perotti (1995b).
3Note, however, that the feasibility and desirability of this type of fine tuning have been questioned,
starting with the famous argument on "long and variable lags", by Milton Friedman.
only by principles of optimal taxation, but are the result of various politically induced
deficit biases (see the survey by Alesina and Perotti (1995a)). In this case, a balanced
budget law may be a second best solution. One would have to trade-off the distortions of
the balanced budget law on the optimal tax policies, against the reduction of politically
induced distortions on actual policies.
We feel that balanced budget laws are neither necessary nor sufficient to insure fiscal dis-
cipline, particularly if applied to a non transparent budget process. Balanced budget laws
can generate incentives for creative budgeting, which more or less easily can circumvent the
law. Instead, appropriate procedures may not require numerical targets, so that one may
maintain flexibility on the budget balance front (needed to implement tax smoothing poli-
cies) without giving up fiscal discipline. To evaluate this claim, we now turn to procedural
issues.
2.2 Procedural Rules.
One can identify three phases in the budget process:
1) the formulation of a budget proposal within the executive;
2) the presentation and approval of the budget in the legislature;
3) the implementation of the budget by the bureaucracy.
We focus mostly on the first two aspects, although we will touch upon the third one
as well, particularly with reference to recent reforms in New Zealand. Two issues are
crucial in our view: first, the voting procedures leading to the formulation and approval
of the budget; second, the degree of transparency of the budget. Voting procedures are
clearly important because they establish who and when has an influence on the final budget
outcome. Transparency is equally important and perhaps, in the case of Italy, even more
important, since creative budgeting and strategic ambiguity can circumvent even the most
stringent voting procedures. In fact, the two issues are strictly connected: voting procedures
have an impact on the final outcome if the latter can be monitored because it is transparent.
We begin with voting procedures.
2.2.1 Voting Procedures.
We focus upon a crucial trade-off between two types of institutions. One type, which we
label, for lack of a better word, authoritarian, limits the democratic accountability of the
budget process. The second type, which for lack of a better word, we call collegial, has the
opposite features. Authoritarian institutions are those that, for instance, give strong pre-
rogatives to the Prime Minister (or the Finance, or Treasury Minister) to overrule spending
ministers within intergovernmental negotiations on the formulation of the budget. Also,
authoritarian institutions limit in a variety of ways the capacity of the legislature to amend
the budget proposed by the government. Collegial institutions emphasize the democratic
rule at every stage, like the prerogatives of spending ministers within the government, the
prerogatives of the legislature vis a vis the government, and the rights of the minority
opposition in the legislature.
One can identify a trade-off between these two types of institutions: authoritarian in-
stitutions are more likely to enforce fiscal restraint, avoid large and persistent deficits and
implement fiscal adjustments more promptly. On the other hand, they are less respectful of
the rights of the minority, and more likely to generate budgets heavily tilted in favor of the
interests of the majority. Collegial institutions have the opposite features. Authoritarian
institutions heavily favor the government majority; collegial institutions emphasize consen-
sus building in the budget formation process. Collegial institutions create incentives for
compromise between the majority by the minority, leading to moderation in policy mak-
ing, but also to delays in policy implementation. Authoritarian institutions deliver more
prompt policy making but more polarized policies, that is, policies more tilted towards the
majority supporting the government.
This trade-off can have important positive and normative implications. From a positive
standpoint the evidence suggests that authoritarian institutions promote fiscal restraints,
(see Von Hagen (1992)). From a normative point of view one may argue that, generally
speaking, institutional choices close to the extremes of this institutional trade-off are un-
likely to be optimal. Also, this institutional choice depends upon the initial conditions.
For example, a country with a high debt/GDP ratio, contemplating an institutional re-
form should look more favorably toward authoritarian institutions than, ceteris paribus, a
country with a low debt/GDP ratio.
The theoretical literature on these issues is typically inspired by American institutions,
and focuses almost exclusively on the American Congress. However, if viewed cum grano
salis this literature can shed light on other countries, and on Italy in particular. Much of
this research is based, directly or indirectly, upon a view of the budget as the result of con-
flicting interests of representatives with geographically based constituencies. In particular,
it addresses two problems: the determination of the size of the budget and the allocation
of projects amongst different districts. Weingast, Shepsle and Johnsen (1981) provide one
of the clearest discussions of these basic problems. They argue that representatives with
geographically based constituencies ask for spending programs which benefit their district
and are financed nationwide. Thus, representatives do not internalize the true' costs of
financing such projects. As a result, the budget is over expanded.
In a very influential body of research, Baron (1989, 1991) and Baron and Ferejohn
(1989a,b), study how different voting rules influence the size, allocation and efficiency of
the budget, within the context of 'pork barrel' spending. They emphasize a distinction
between closed rules and open rules in amendments. A closed rule is one in which a
proposal made by a member of the legislature has to be voted immediately up or down.
If it is approved, the "game is over;" if it is rejected a new member of the legislature can
make another proposal which is voted again up or down. An open rule is one in which the
proposal made by the member selected is subject to amendments on the floor.
A proposal involves the choice of a budget and an allocation of benefits amongst dis-
tricts, i.e., representatives. The critical differences between the two procedures is that a
closed rule attributes more power to the first agenda setter. In fact, with a closed rule the
agenda setter needs only to offer to the minimal majority (50 percent plus one) enough
benefits to make them prefer the proposal to the continuation of the process with the pro-
posal of another agenda setter, if the first proposal is rejected. Each legislator knows that
voting against the proposal on the floor, even if it generates relatively little benefit for his
district, may lead to an even worse proposal next period. Thus the threshold of accep-
tance is relatively low. This implies that relatively inefficient proposals can pass, 4 and
the agenda setter may obtain the lion's share of benefits within the winning majority. In
fact, even a relatively inefficient budget (i.e., low aggregate benefits relative to taxation) is
enough to keep a bare majority sufficiently happy relative to the continuation of the voting
process.
With an open rule the power of the agenda setter is diminished, and he will take that
into account when making a proposal. When making the first proposal the agenda setter
faces a trade off. If he offers a universal program, with benefits for every district, he may
get immediate approval because no legislator would want to amend. However, this strategy
is expensive, since it saves relatively small benefits for the district of the agenda setter. On
the other extreme, if the first agenda setter makes a proposal which distributes benefits to
a bare majority, there is a relatively high chance that a member of the minority will be
selected next period to make amendments, and he will object to the proposal, attempting
to form another majority. Similar considerations apply to members of the first majority
who receive relatively small net benefits from the first proposal. In equilibrium, those who
are selected to make a proposal will balance these two incentives and will propose budgets
which have some probability, between zero and one, to pass in the next vote, depending
upon who is selected to make amendments.
These considerations provide the intuition for several results: 1. An open rule creates
delays in the approval of a proposal, where 'delays' means that more than one vote is
needed for a budget to pass. 2. A closed rule leads to the adoption of more inefficient
budgets, namely budgets where the ratio of aggregate benefits over aggregate taxation is
lower. 3. A closed rule leads to the adoption of 'majoritarion' allocation rules, i.e. such
that the benefits are allocated to a '50 percent plus one' fraction of the legislature, open
4Efficiciency is defined as the ratio of aggregate benefits of the budget to aggregate costs.
rules may lead to a distribution of benefits in which more than the minimum majority of
legislators receive positive net benefits. 4. With an open rule the distribution of benefits
within the winning majority are more egalitarian than with a closed rule.
These results highlight very clearly several aspects of the trade-off between authoritarian
and collegial procedures. A closed rule achieves a quick approval of proposal, at the cost
of implementing 'unfair' and more inefficient budgets. Budgets are unfair in the sense that
they are tilted in favor of those who make the first proposal, and always distribute benefits
to the smallest possible majority. For simplicity and tractability, in the formal literature
reviewed here, the power to make proposals is attributed randomly, and every legislator
has the same probability of being called to make the first proposal. In the actual practice
of parliamentary democracy, the executive has the prerogative of making the first proposal.
Thus, arrangements similar to a closed rule favor the executive while an open rule weakens
it. 5
This 'Americanist' literature provides very useful insights for our study of Italian budget
procedures. However, three caveats limit its direct applicability:
1) This literature is static, namely it addresses the size and composition of the budget, not
the budget balance, i.e., the intertemporal distribution of spending and taxation. 6
2) The second limitation of this literature lies in its emphasis on 'pork barrel projects,'
i.e., on public projects with geographically concentrated benefits. While this emphasis was
empirically grounded three decades ago, it is less and less so in recent years. Table 1 shows
the share of OECD budgets devoted to projects that can be considered 'pork barrel'
and geographically based is shrinking, relative to transfer programs and entitlements which
are broad based. Clearly, some transfer programs have a geographical base: for instance
disability pensions have been used in Italy as an indirect transfer from the North to the
South. However, the emphasis placed by this formal literature on pork barrel projects is
disproportionate relative to the current relevance of these projects in the budget.
3) A third problem is the almost exclusive emphasis of this literature on the legislature, with
reasonably little attention to the executive. One can argue whether or not this emphasis is
justified for the case of the US, but, in our view, it is beyond doubt that one needs to focus
more on the formulation of budgets within the government, in Parliamentary democracies
such as Italy, and particularly in situations where the role of the legislature is limited in
5Another issue, addressed in Ferejohn and Krebihel (1987), is the order of voting in the budget process.
Intuitively, one may argue that voting first on the overall size of the budget and then on its composition
should lead to more fiscal restraint than the opposite sequence of votes. However, these two authors show
that this intuitive result does not necessarily hold. In fact, strategic legislators, when voting on the size
of the budget, will anticipate how the first vote will influence the second vote in the allocation. Although
this is a theoretically interesting result, in our view one should read the Ferejohn and Krebihel's paper as
a useful warning against oversimplifying the effects of certain procedures on final outcomes.
6Severe technical difficulties appear if one extends these models of legislative voting procedures to a
dynamic setting. For some initial progress along this line see Chari and Cole (1993) and Velasco (1994).
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how it can amend the budget proposed by the executive. Note, however that some of the
literature on committees, procedural rules, order of voting, closed vs. open rules, can be
applied mutatis mutandis to the decision process within the government.
2.2.2 Transparency of the Budget.
The budgets of modern economies are very complex, and certainly in the case of Italy, too
complex. This complexity, partly artificially created, helps in various practices that hide
the real balance (current and future) of costs and benefits for the taxpayers. Politicians
have incentives to hide' taxes, over emphasize the benefits of spending, and hide government
liabilities, equivalent to future taxes. Politicians have little incentive to produce simple,
clear, and transparent budgets.
At least two theoretical arguments support this claim. First the theory of fiscal illu-
sion, illustrated particularly clearly by Buchanan and Wagner (1977). According to this
view, the voters typically overestimate the benefits of public spending and underestimate
the costs of taxation, current and future. Lack of transparency of the budget can increase
the voters' confusion and reduce the politicians' incentives to be fiscally responsible. Else-
where (Alesina and Perotti (1995a)) we have raised some doubts about the role of "fiscal
illusion" as the main explanation of large and persistent deficits, such as those of countries
with debt/GDP ratios of 100 percent or more. However, lack of transparency and voters'
confusion can certainly interfere negatively with effective budget control, particularly when
substantial fiscal adjustments are needed.
The second argument does not rely on voters' irrationality and confusion. Several pa-
pers, although in difference contexts, (e.g., Cukierman and Meltzer (1986), Alesina and
Cukierman (1991)) highlight the benefit for the policymakers of a certain amount of ambi-
guity even when they face a rational electorate. The idea is that by creating confusion and,
in particular, by making it less clear how policies translate into outcomes, policymakers
can retain a strategic advantage versus rational, but not fully informed voters. This infor-
mational advantage would disappear with transparent procedures. In particular, at least
up to a point, the less the electorate knows and understands about the budget process, the
more the politicians can act strategically and use fiscal deficits and overspending to achieve
opportunistic goals.
Rogoff and Sibert (1988) and Rogoff (1990) make a similar point in the context of
political business cycle models. They show that if the voters cannot easily observe the
composition of the budget (either on the spending and/or on the financing side), then
policy makers can follow loose fiscal policies before elections and increase their chances of
reappointment.
In summary, the theoretical literature reviewed in this short section is quite useful in
addressing the issue of voting procedures, and in fact our discussion on this point for the
Italian case, in sections 3.6 and 3.7 below, is clearly based upon these theoretical results.
On the other hand the treatment of the issue of transparency in the theoretical literature,
although quite interesting, is somewhat distant from the details of the budget process, much
more so than the treatment of voting voting procedures. Once the policymakers incentives
to be strategically ambiguous are well understood, one is left with the rather difficult task
of understanding how, in reality, policymakers obfuscate the budget and what to do about
it. Thus, in addressing the issue of transparency in the Italian budget process (sections 3.1
to 3.5 below), our links with the theoretical literature are somewhat less specific.
3 The Italian Budget Process: Problems and Pro-
posals.
3.1 The Budget as "Legge Formale".
3.1.1 The problems.
A unique feature of the Italian budget process is that the Legge di Bilancio (LB) can only
reflect existing legislation, and therefore cannot decide new taxes and new expenditures
(art. 81 of the Constitution, comma 3). Quite simply, this implies that the LB cannot fulfill
its main role, namely to provide a clear and transparent venue for the fiscal manoeuvre
of the government. Thus, all the interventions that should implement the Government's
fiscal policy must be carried out in the Legge Finanziaria (LF) and Provvedimenti Collegati
(PC). Once passed, these become existing legislation and therefore can be incorporated in
the LB. This is done by amending the LB with the Nota di Variazioni, which is changed
hastily to reflect the latest changes to the LF and PC, as they are modified during the
budget debate.
To accomplish all this, the order of votes during the budget session, as established by
the Regolamento Senato, art 129, comma 4, is the following,
1) art. 1 of the LB, i.e. the 3 titoli on revenues and the titolo on "Accensione di Prestiti";
2) art. 1 of the LF, containing the target Saldo Netto da Finanziare (SNF);
3) the rest of the LF, together with the PC;
4) the full LB is voted on last, after incorporating the last version of the Nota di Variazioni
that reflects all the changes to LF and PC intervened during the debate.
It is obvious that this process creates confusion and uncertainty, as the Nota di Vari-
azioni and the LB change daily with the fate of the articles of the LF and, especially, of
the PC. In particular, this process derails the attention from substantive issues, towards
procedural issues.
9
Thus, the first crucial problem of the budget process can be summarized as follows:
Problem 1.
Because the LB can only reflect existing legislation, the fiscal manoeuvre must be carried
out in the LF and in the PC. This introduces enormous procedural complications and
greatly increases the uncertainty surrounding the fiscal manoeuvre.
3.1.2 Proposals.
We are not sure about the rationale for art. 81, comma 3 of the Constitution. Originally,
it might have been intended as a fiscal-discipline device. However, the fact of the matter is
that the government must be able, somewhere in the budget process, to carry out its fiscal
manoeuvre, and therefore to set new taxes or expenditures. Given this, the budget process
should just create the conditions for this to happen in the most transparent and informed
way.
What is perhaps most surprising is that these enormous complications are completely
unnecessary. They all stem from article 81 of the Constitution, and they would all go with
it. Thus, our first proposal is extremely simple: comma 3 of article 81 of the Constitution
should be abolished. Under this proposal, there would be no distinction between LB and
LF. They would all become a single document, on which the government and Parliament
can focus to discuss substantive issues. To summarize:
Proposal 1.
Article 81, comma 3 of the Constitution should be abolished.
3.2 The Regulation of the Finanziaria.
3.2.1 The problems.
Not only the Government cannot carry out its fiscal manoeuvre in the LB, but the existing
legislation severely limits even the fiscal manoeuvre that can be carried out in the LF.
Article 11 of 1. 468 establishes that the LF can only:
1) change the tax rates;
2) set the Ricorso al Mercato and the SNF for the Amministrazione Centrale (AC), in
commitment terms;
3) define the allocation of funds to multi-year expenditures ("rimodulazione");
4) set the fondi speciali;
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5) define the appropriations for public employment contracts;
and a few other things.
When combined with art. 81 of the Constitution, the effect of art. 11 of law 468 is that
the two most important budget documents, the LB and the LF, cannot contain legislation
on exactly the types of interventions that are especially needed in times of fiscal reform,
i.e. structural changes to the tax and expenditure systems. For instance, the reform of the
pension system or the simplification of the tax system cannot be part of the LF.
We are aware that this was exactly the original intent of the 1988 reform: avoid the
phenomenon of the " Finanziarie omnibus", which on several occasions the Government had
used to "sneak in" all sorts of measures without adequate Parliamentary debate. However,
in our view this attempt has backfired, by forcing the Government to resort to other
means to carry out its fiscal manoeuvre, thus increasing the complexity of the process. For
instance, in 1990 and 1991 the Government presented only 3 PC, but the PC concerning
revenues had about 80, very heterogeneous articles. In 1993, the PC consisted of 75 pages,
and the LF of only 8 pages, plus 80 pages detailing the Tabelle. Thus, the 1988 reform
simply implies that the same interventions are now split between two separate documents.
The uncertainty surrounding the budget process has increased, too. The success of
the fiscal manoeuvre set out in the LF, in particular the attainment of the target SNF,
depends on a legislation that is discussed and passed quite independently of the LF itself.
This increases the uncertainty surrounding the budget process and the incentives to resort
to emergency measures. For instance, in 1989 only a few of the PC presented by the Gov-
ernment passed by the end of the budget session; in order to formally attain the target
figure for the SNF, the Government had to issue several emergency decrees replacing the
PC that had not been passed. We can summarize the position on the present structure of
the LF as follows:
Problem 2.
The combined effect of art.81, comma 3 of the Constitution and of art. 11, law 468 is
that the two most important budget documents, the LB and the LF, cannot address some
critical aspects of fiscal policy, contain important legislation that is indispensable to any
modern fiscal policy-making. In order to carry out the fiscal manoeuvre, the Government
must then resort to a third type of legislation, the PC. This introduces further procedural
complications, further uncertainty in the budget process, and creates great incentives to
resort to emergency legislation.
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3.2.2 Proposals.
The transparency of the budget process is diminished, rather than enhanced, by the current
system that progressively takes away legislative instruments from the Government (first
the LB, then the LF). We believe it would be much more straightforward to acknowledge
explicitly the fact that sometimes during the fiscal year, in some budget document, a
Government must be able to propose all the types of measures that modern policy-making
requires, and that it would be much better to allow it to do so in a unitary way rather
than in a fragmented and obscure way that only invites budget gimmicks on the part of
the Government and Parliament.
Thus, we believe art. 11, comma 3 of law 468 should be abolished. Together with
Proposal 1, our proposal would then imply that the current four budget documents, the
LB, LF, PC, and the Nota di Variazioni, would collapse into a single budget document,
which Parliament would have plenty of time to discuss and approve. From now on, we
will refer to this single budget document that we propose simply as "the Budget", to be
distinguished from the current Legge di Bilancio, which is one of the four documents that
we propose to merge.
Proposal 2.
Art. 11, comma 3 of 1. 468 should be abolished. One single document, "the Budget",
should contain all elements of the fiscal manoeuvre that the Government deems neccessary
to achieve its goals.
3.3 The role of "Programmazione".
3.3.1 The problems.
The budget session that starts in September is not supported by an informed presentation of
the trends and of the alternative scenarios that lie before the Government and Parliament.
Instead, precious time and energies are devoted to the preparation and discussion of the
Documento di Programmazione Economica e Finanziaria (DPEF), 7 which has a heavy -
and outdated - emphasis on planning, and of other documents.
The preparation and discussion of the new Budget that we have envisioned above should
be guided by sound and reliable figures of the path fiscal policy would take in the absence
of interventions, and by a reliable estimate of the costs and benefits of alternative inter-
7The DPEF has been introduced with the reform of 1988. The formal deadline for its presentation is
May 15. However, this document has frequently been presented to Parliament much later, in June or even
July.
12
vent ions. It is our contention that, at present, all the budget documents that precede the
budget session fail to provide such a guidance.
Currently, the Bilanci tendenziali in the Disegno di Legge di Bilancio and in the DPEF
8
 not always provide reliable and user-friendly information on the path of fiscal policy in
the absence of interventions. We will focus here on the treatment of inflation. With the
current Italian debt/GDP ratios the target fabbisogno is highly sensitive to the assumptions
about inflation and interest rates. Credible forecasts of the inflation rate are therefore
crucial. However, the rate of inflation, and therefore interest rates, tend to be consistently
underpredicted by substantial amounts. As a result interest payments are in general the
most important source of forecast errors among expenditures (see Table 2).






































































Source: Commissione Tecnica Spesa Pubblica (1994) and Ragioneria Generale dello Stato (1994). pi: in-
flation rate, i: average nominal interest rate on outstanding debt. G: expenditure of State Sector, net of
interest expenditure, in percentage of GDP. /: interest expenditure, State Sector, in percentage of GDP.
In addition, because the DPEF is mostly a planning document, it often fails to keep a
clear distinction between trends and plans. In fact, large parts of the Bilancio tendenziale
8There are two possible types of bilanci tendenziale. The "Bilancio tendenziale a legislazione vigente",
assumes that the existing legislation will not change. The "Bilancio tendenziale a politiche invariate",
instead, assumes that the existing policies will be continued. The difference between the two concepts
consists in the treatment of the effects of expenditures and revenues that, according to existing legislation,
should not be repeated next year. The first type of Bilancio tendenziale assumes that these expenditures
and revenues will indeed be discontinued. The second assumes that all existing policies will be maintained.
The Bilanci tendenziali in the Disegno di Legge di Bilancio and in the DPEF are at legislazione vigente.
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that it contains 9 are based on planned figures for macroeconomic variables. 10 This is true
for instance for public wages - which incorporate the effects of planned wage settlements
- and interest expenditure - which incorporate the effects of planned inflation rates, and
therefore planned nominal interest rates. As a consequence, the Bilancio tendenziale can fail
to provide a reliable picture of the trends of fiscal policy and of the needs for intervention.
A good example of the confusion this might generate is in the 1993 DPEF. The same
target inflation rate, 3.5 (down from 4.5 in the previous year), is explicitly assumed for
the projections on both the trend and the target interest expenditure (p. 15). n This
reduction in the inflation rate by 1% is also explicitly recognized as the crucial factor
in the reduction in interest rates. 12 Finally, the document assumes that the lower
interest rates will lead to a reduction in the target interest expenditure relative to the
trend expenditure (pp. 22-23). 13 It is hard to gather a clear picture of the behavior
of interest expenditure and of the effects of the planned interventions from these three
logically inconsistent statements.
A detailed Bilancio tendenziale at existing legislation is contained in the "Disegno di
Legge di Bilancio", to be presented to Parliament each year by the end of July. However,
it receives very little attention, because it is soon to be amended by the effects of the inter-
ventions in the drafts of the LF and PC. In fact, the Bilancio in the Relazione Provisionale
e Programmatica (RPP) of September already incorporates these effects. Moreover, the
Disegno di Legge di Bilancio is not associated with a description of the macro framework,
which instead appears in the DPEF. Finally, the Disegno di Legge di Bilancio presents
detailed figures by ministries, but does not contain aggregate figures on, say, broad cate-
gories of expenditure or the SNF. Thus, the Bilancio tendenziale in the Disegno di Legge
di Bilancio too provides little guidance to the subsequent process.
Note that when the discussion of the LF starts, Parliament has already seen at least
three bilanci tendenziali: in the DPEF, in the Disegno di Legge di Bilancio, and in the
RPP. These Bilanci tendenziali differ in the timing, in the coverage (the Disegno di Legge
9The DPEF contains a Bilancio tendenziale a legislazione vigente, in cash terms, for the SS and the
Public Sector. It also contains a Bilancio tendenziale a legislazione vigente, in commmitment terms, for
the AC. In both cases, the Bilancio tendenziale covers a three-year period.
10Giarda (1989) p. 27 provides an interesting and informed treatment of this issue.
n
"Nella determinazione del quadro macroeconomico assunto come riferimento per la determinazione
delle tendenze e degli obiettivi di finanza pubblica, si prevede una decisa riduzione del tasso di inflazione
nel 1994."
12
"A1 contempo una minore inflazione accelera la riduzione degli oneri degli interessi e contribuisce cosi'
alia riduzione del fabbisogno pubblico."
13
"In assenza di interventi, la spesa per interessi relativa allo scenario tendenziale e' stata determinata
assumendo che alia fine dell'anno in corso il tasso nominale lordo dei BOT sia pari al 10,5 per cento....Si
ritiene, invece, che l'attuazione della manovra correttiva proposta consenta di ipotizzare per la costruzione
del quadro programmatico un profilo dei tassi inferiore al precedente."
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di Bilancio is only on the AC, the DPEF mainly on the SS, the RPP on both), and in
the amount of the planned fiscal manoeuvre they incorporate. However, it is clear that
these differences do not provide any additional and useful information: rather, they only
contribute to blur the picture.
While there is no lack of information on bilanci tendenziali, when Parliament votes the
LF and LB, it has seen three different Bilanci tendenziali, but it has never seen a systematic
evaluation of the alternative scenarios of fiscal policy. For instance, the DPEF's and the
RPP's of 1993 and, especially, 1994 contain several pages on the reform of the pension
system, and, in the case of the RPP's, with minute details of the planned intervention.
However, they never illustrate the budget saving effects of different values of the various
policy instruments, like retirement age, indexation rules, etc. It is difficult for Parliament
and for the media to evaluate the fiscal manoeuvre in the absence of any information on
possible alternatives.
The DPEF also sets the objectives for the incoming Government's fiscal manoeuvre, 14
and in particular the target value for the fabbisogno of the SS and the SNF of the AC. 15
However, because this occurs so early in the budget process, the details are largely left to
the future. In fact, the DPEF sets only very aggregate objectives, and contains only a very
vague description of the measures the Government intends to implement, usually without
any quantification of their projected savings.
For example, Table 3 reproduces some figures form the Bilancio tendenziale and the
Bilancio programmatico for 1994, 1995 and 1996 from the 1993 DPEF.
Notice the huge expenditure cuts (more than 10%, once the growth of GDP is taken into
account) and the drastic reductions in the fabbisogno for all three years (in particular, note
that the planned interventions would have led to a near halving of the nominal fabbisogno
in 1996!)
The DPEF described these interventions as follows: "Per quanto riguarda le spese, i
provvedimenti proposti riguardano, innanzitutto, l'organizzazione e il funzionamento delle
pubbliche amministrazioni, per eliminare doppioni, sprechi, sovrapposizioni.... Si ritiene
infatti possibile ottenere risparmio con una razionalizzazione e un riordino delle attivita' e
delle strutture pubbliche, anche senza incidere, se non a fini di eliminazione degli sprechi,
sulle prestazioni rese dai poteri pubblici ai cittadini....Un'altra parte della manovra in-
cidera', pur se in misura minore, sui trasferimenti alle famiglie."
This passage exemplifies well three typical aspects of the budget process at this stage.
First, notice the total absence of any minimal attempt at quantifying the interventions.
14In fact, the main objective of the DPEF is to provide a Bilancio programmatico for the SS, in com-
mitment terms, over a three-year period.
15Because the DPEF mostly refers to the SS, the target SNF generally receives only scant attention. For
instance, in the 1994 DPEF there was no mention of the AC accounts, and therefore of the SNF.
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Source: DPEF 1993. Outlays exclude interests. All figures are in billions of
liras.
Second, the expected savings from razionalization are clearly unreasonably high, especially
in the current Italian situation where the main source of fiscal problems is an exceptionally
high expenditure on transfer programs. 16 Third, and as a consequence of the second
point, the DPEF sounds as if these extremely large budget cuts could be achieved without
costs.
It is clear that there are only political advantages for Parliament from subscribing to
such an ambitious yet seemingly painless program. But then the DPEF sets the budget
process on the wrong foot: it invites vagueness and excessive optimism exactly at the time
when what is needed is a clear description of the trends of fiscal policy and an illustration
of the costs associated with alternative scenarios.
One might argue that these problems are such more in theory than in practice, because
the DPEF is only a short and generic document that does not constrain the future fiscal
manoeuvre and to which all the agents involved pay only lip service. This is not always
so. Art. 11, comma 6 of 1.468 the LF cannot "determinare tassi di evoluzione delle spese
medesime, sia correnti che in conto capitale, incompatibili con le regole determinate...nel
DPEF" (1. 468, art. 11, comma 6). Although the wording of this clause is unnecessar-
ily vague (and concerns only expenditure), the Risoluzione del Senato of July 1991 has
established that, for the first of the three years covered by the LF, the SNF must reach
the objective set in the DPEF. In fact, the "disegno di legge di Bilancio" presented in
July usually does respect the SNF implicit in the DPEF. This has also been true for the
16For instance, in 1992 37% of the general government expenditures was on public pensions!
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LF. Note, however, that although the SNF in the LF is usually very close to the DPEF,
its composition is not always so: for instance, in 1991 the SNF in the LF was prcatically
identical to that of the DPEF, but revenues and current expenditures exceeded the DPEF
figures by about ll,000bn and 20,000bn respectively, while capital expenditures were lower
by about 7,000bn.
Thus, to the extent that it is actually binding for the subsequent stages of the budget
process, the DPEF is not only a loss of time and resources but also genuinely misleading,
because it makes creative accounting practically unavoidable.
We can summarize the main problems we have discussed in this part as follows:
Problem 3.
At present, the budget process fails on the two most important steps before the discussion
of the budget. First, there are too many Bilanci tendenziali, but none provides a clear and
reliable picture of the trends of fiscal policy. Second, at no stage of the budget process is
information provided that allows an appreciation and evaluation of the effects of alternative
policies.
Problem 4.
Because the DPEF sets only the aggregate objectives of the fiscal manoeuvre, and at an
early stage of the budget process, it only provides a very vague description of the Gov-
ernment's plan, without any realistic quantification of its expected savings. Thus, at the
time Parliament votes on the target figure for the SNF, which becomes binding for the
subsequent budget process, there is practically no notion of the means to attain it and,
therefore, of whether it is realistic. This invites creative accounting at subsequent stages
of the budget process.
3.3.2 Proposals.
We believe that all efforts should be concentrated on enhancing the two truly valuable roles
of a document like the DPEF: provide a detailed and reliable information on the trends
both of the economy and of the budget, which the Government and Parliament can use to
locate the needs for intervention, and put clearly before the Government and Parliament
the possible alternatives, with their associated costs and benefits.
Macroeconomic planning should not play any role at this stage. In fact, we believe that
one problem with the existing budget process is exactly that the ability of the Government
to manage the economy is greatly overestimated. Besides, the Bilanci programmatici be-
yond the first year currently play no role whatsoever in the budget process. Even from a
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merely formal point of view, they are not binding. Nor could they have been, given the
average turnover of Italian governments.
We also believe that the DPEF, and any subsequent document, should abstain from
three-years projections of the economy. The emphasis on long-run projections is another
legacy of the planning tradition of the '60's and '70's: long-term planning obviously needs
long-term forecasting. However, exactly like the notion that the economy can be planned,
the notion that it is possible to forecasts macroeconomic variables reliably three years into
the future is empirically questionable. Even international organizations, like the IMF or
OECD, with all their expertise and manpower, nowadays tend to abstain from long-term
forecasts, and in any case are aware and honestly underline the shaky grounds on which
they are based. The RGS clearly does not have more expertise than IMF or OECD to
engage in long-term forecasting.
Therefore, the DPEF should be divested of all its planning and long-term forecast-
ing implications and should just be merged with the Disegno di Legge di Bilancio. The
new document should focus on the much more modest, but much more useful, task of
disseminating reliable information on what will happen to the budget in the absence of
interventions, and what the effects of possible interventions are.
This information should be accurate and user-friendly. Relatively reliable and impartial
forecasts on macroeconomic variables are easily available from international organizations
and forecasting firms. The credibility of the budget projections would be greatly enhanced
if the RGS used these (presumably) impartial forecasts. For instance, the official inflation
forecasts underlying the computations in the Bilancio tendenziale could be the average of
the inflation forecasts of three organizations, for instance OECD, IMF and DRI. 17
A possible objection to our proposal is that it still leaves the Government complete
freedom to determine the effects of the forecasted values of macroeconomic variables on
the evolution of budget variables. We will come back to this problem in section 3.4,
where we propose ways to minimize the incentives to manipulate budgets forecasts and to
overestimate the effects of interventions.
The new Bilancio tendenziale should also be user-friendly. This means that it should
have exactly the same format as the new Budget that we propose above, so that for each
item in the budget one can compare the trend with the figures proposed by the Government.
At present, the RPP largely duplicates, with greater detail, the DPEF. It presents the
Bilancio tendenziale, the underlying macroeconomic trends, and the fiscal manoeuvre in
the LF and PC. Only this last part provides a new service. In fact, we believe the RPP
17A common objection to this proposal is that the RGS has informational advantages on outside orga-
nizations in forecasting variables like the rate of inflation, since it is in the best position to forecasts those
measures that affect the rate of inflation. However, the ability of fiscal policy to quickly influence variables
like the inflation rate and interest rates is clearly overrated. In any case, this objection does not apply to
the preparation of the Bilancio tendenziale, which should not be based on planned figures.
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should simply be regarded as the document that accompanies and describes the Budget.
Proposal 3.
The DPEF and Disegno di Legge di Bilancio a legislazione invariata should be abolished.
Their successor should not contain any Bilancio programmatico or any long-term forecasts.
It should only contain two bilanci tendenziali, at existing legislation and at existing policies,
with exactly the same format as the new Budget we propose, so that the two documents
can be immediately compared. This document should also contain a description and quan-
titative evaluation of alternative scenarios of policy interventions.
The RPP should be limited to accompany and describe the Budget.
Proposal 4.
The macroeoconomic forecasts underlying the preparation of the Budget and of the succes-
sor of the DPEF should be derived from international organizations and forecasting firms.
3.4 Reducing the scope for creative accounting.
3.4.1 The problems.
As many observers have noted, the Italian budget process does not lack formal constraints
on the ability of the Government and Parliament to increase the size of the deficit. The
combined effect of various articles of the 1. 468 is that an increase in the deficit of the AC
can only result from three factors ( see Onofri, Pisauro and Siniscalco (1994), p.90):
a) an increase in expenditure or a fall in revenues at existing legislation;
b) an underestimate of expenditures or overestimate of revenues of new legislation;
c) an increase in capital expenditure.
Furthermore, the LF is also subject to an overall constraint on the SNF:
d) the SNF in the LF cannot exceed the corresponding figure in the DPEF.
It is patently clear that these constraints, in many cases even stronger than in the legis-
lation of most other countries, have been totally ineffective in controlling the growth of ex-
penditure. But one can go a step further: these constraints have created perverse incentives
that have made the formation and presentation of the budget even more complicated and
less transparent and, ultimately, have contributed to the the loose fiscal policy stance of
the last two decades.
Quite simply, the counterpart of formal constraints on the budget is creative accounting
to circumvent these constraints. This is a common phenomenon in all countries, and to
some extent it is unavoidable. But it is our contention that the peculiarities of the Italian
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budget process have greatly exacerbated the extent of and the distortions created by the
practice of creative accounting.
Roughly speaking, there are four types of distortions that fall under the heading of
creative accounting:
1) postponment of expenditures or anticipation of budget savings;
2) shifting of expenditure from the current to the capital account;
3) underestimate of expenditures and overestimate of revenues;
4) recording of debt "below the line".
The first source of creative accounting is the narrowness of the coverage of the sector
for which the target deficit is defined. This creates incentives to engage in the first type
of distortions, by shifting expenditure and debt off-budget, to agencies outside the sector
whose deficit is set by the budget documents. The mechanism is well known, and has been
described in several contributions (see for instance Giavazzi (1994), Commissione Tecnica
per la Spesa Pubblica (1994), and Ragazzi (1994)). The classic examples are transfers to
INPS, USL and Regioni. The channels are slightly different, although the logic is the same.
Because of the systematic underestimate of the financial requirements of INPS in the LF,
INPS must resort to building up its debt at the Treasury Account. Because the deficit of
the Treasury Account is not part of the target SNF (which is defined on the AC only), this
allows the latter to be formally respected (note, however, that the figure for the fabbisogno,
which refers to the SS, is affected.)
Similarly, USLL and Regioni are encouraged to incur liabilities with commercial banks,
whose repayment will be taken up by the State. This achieves a significant postponment
of the expenditure, without any effect on the SNF or fabbisogno until the debt will have
to be repaid. Similar stories apply to state-owned enterprises like IRI and, a particularly
conspicuous case, EFIM, all of which are outside both the AC and the SS.
It is important to realize that this stratagem also causes a distortion of type 2). In fact,
under existing accounting rules, the repayment of the principal of a debt, when it occurs, is
recorded in the capital account. Only the interest expenditure affects the current account
of the budget. Thus, these procedures allow not only a significant postponment of the
recording of an expenditure, but also its transfer to the capital account. This is important
because capital expenditures can be financed through debt, and because they can be more
easily further postponed to the future through the mechanism of "rimodulazione".
A second channel through which distortion 1) (the postponment of expenditure) is
implemented is the often unorthodox use of the Provvedimenti Collegati that we noted
above and, especially, of Fondi Speciali. One major problem with Fondi Speciali was that
they had become an all-purpose reserve of funds, whose destination could be changed at
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will to satisfy the need to cover new expenditure. The 1988 reform established fairly
strict guidelines for the use of unutilized Fondi Speciali. Perhaps more importantly, it
introduced the Fondi Speciali Negativi: the effects of a future piece of legislation that
reduces expenditure or increases taxation must be recorded as accantonamenti to a Fondo
Speciale Negativo, which once the piece of legislation has been approved will make available
a corresponding accantonamento to a Fondo Speciale Positivo, to be utilized when the
accompanying legislation increasing expenditure is passed. The original purpose of this
instrument was to set explictly reductions in some expenditures against corresponding
increases in other expenditures.
However, the need to satisfy the SNF has led to a use of the Accantonamenti Negativi
that is far from the original intent. First and foremost, the Accantonamenti Negativi
are often extremely vague and unrealistic in their assumptons about the savings of future
legislation. Parliament will have to reckon with the effects of future legislation a later stage,
after the budget session, with its pressure to meet the target SNF, is over. It is therefore
only natural that the Government and the Parliament itself will try to defuse the tension by
simply postponing the difficult choices to the future. Second, against the letter of the law,
the Accantonamenti Negativi are often not linked to a piece of legislation already presented
in Parliament. For example, in 1991 the LF had AN for 20950bn in 1993 and 34770bn for
1994. However, in 1991 no legislation had even been conceived to support these savings.
Needless to say, these savings never materialized (see De Joanna (1993), p. 137).
More generally, the third type of distortions - underestimating expenditure and over-
estimating revenues - is likely to arise any time that the budget can defer the specifics of
interventions that contribute to the SNF. Examples of obviously inadequate or downright
unreasonable explanations of projected savings abound. A particularly egregious one is
the decreto-legge that was one of the 4 PC to the LF of 1992, projecting revenues for
15,000bn from privatization, which, according to the Corte dei Conti, was not supported
"ne' da una relazione tecnica dalla quale possano trarsi indicazioni sui criteri seguiti per
la quantificazione degli introiti previsti, ne' da una rigorosa valutazione delle operazioni da
compiere e dei tempi di realizzazione." (from De Ioanna (1993), p. 141).
Unreasonable estimates of budget savings can derive from unreasonable forecasts for
some underlying macrovariables or from unreasonable evaluations of the quantitative effects
of the legislation under exam. Currently, both the forecasts and the criteria to evaluate
the effects of the legislation remain all internal to the RGS. The Government should now
accompany new legislation with a technical note explaining its projected effects (art 11-ter
1. 468, commas 2 and 5). Otherwise, according to the Regolamento Senato, art. 76-bis,
this legislation is inadmissible. In addition, the appropriate committees can ask the Servizi
Studi of the two chambers to verify the Government's estimates.
However, the Government is required to present a technical note only for legislation
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that increases expenditure or decreases taxation. Thus, the requirement of a technical note
does not impair the Government's ability to overestimate budget savings. In addition,
the requirement has not always been respected, particularly for the case of Government
amendments to legislation on the floor (see De Joanna (1993), p.113). Even for draft laws
presented by the Government, in the period January 1, 1989 to April 15, 1992, out of 382
drafts subject to this obligation, 60 were not accompanied by any technical note drafted by
the Government. In 161 cases, there was no verification by a Servizio Studi (see Casarico
(1994), p. 230).
But the crucial problem is still that all the forecasts and criteria to evaluate the effects
of legislation remain all internal to the RGS. As far as we know, there is no macro model of
the Italian and international economies that the RGS uses on a consistent basis to generate
its forecasts, produce the various budgets, and estimate the effects of interventions. This
might not be too much of a problem, as it is not clear that large macro models have a bet-
ter track record than judgmental forecasts. But even judgmental forecasts are presumably
based on some criteria and information, and neither are usually made explicit.
The fourth type of distortions, writing debt "below the line", is in principle the easiest
one to eliminate. For this reason, its persistent, widespread use is also the hardest one
to explain, except maybe that the complexities of the present system provide the ideal
environment for this type of budget gimmicks.
The case of "crediti d'imposta" is a good example. Each year, a substantial part of tax
payments consist of overpayment that have to be returned to the taxpayers. Clearly, the
tax payments corresponding to overpayments are not current revenues, but a liability of the
Central Administration, and as such they should be considered a means of financing the
fabbisogno, not of decreasing it. Instead, in the present arrangement they are considered
tax revenues, and concur with all the other revenues towards meeting the target SNF and
fabbisogno.
Similarly, securities issued by the Cassa Depositi e Prestiti, which is part of the SS,
are not counted as debt "above the line", and therefore do not increase the SNF and
fabbisogno. The recent saga of EFIM provides a stark example of this. In 1994, the Cassa
Depositi e Prestiti was authorized to issue securities for 10,500bn to finance the repayment
of EFIM's debt. Not a lira of this debt increased the fabbisogno (see Ragazzi 1994, p.
17). Note that, had the Cassa Depositi e Prestiti financed this repayment through mutui
rather than securities, this transaction would have shown up in the fabbisogno. Even in this
second case, however, the involvment of the Cassa Depositi e Prestiti would have allowed
an important budget gimmick, by moving the operation from the current to the capital
account.
Note that a byproduct of this practice is the long-noticed absence of a correspondence
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between the fabbisogno and the change in debt. For instance, between 1977 and 1993
the stock of debt increased by at least 100,000bn more than the sum of yearly fabbisogni
(see Onofri, Pisauro and Siniscalco (1994), p. 98). The resulting discrepancy between the
stock of debt and the sum of fabbisogni makes it difficult to evaluate the macroeconomic
significance of the two measures.
To summarize, the present structure of the budget process incentivates creative account-
ing on four grounds in particular:
Problem 5.
The narrowness of the coverage of the sector whose balance is explicitly set by the budget
documents encourages the shifting of expenditure and debt off-budget, thus postponing
expenditure to the future and shifting it to the the capital account (distortions 1) and 2)).
Thus, it makes the target figures on the fabbisogno and the SNF practically meaningless
from a macroeconomic perspective. In addition, it confuses the debate on the fiscal ma-
noeuvre.
Problem 6.
The practice of referring to the effects of future legislation in the LF has led to a substantial
anticipated recording of budget savings to achieve the target SNF. However, because these
savings are uncertain and often do not materialize, the whole budget process becomes more
uncertain and less transparent.
Problem 7.
Two factors contribute to the systematic overestimate of the effects of the legislation in-
cluded in the LF, in the PC, and in all the connected legislation:
a) There is no mechanism to enforce a certain quality or quantity in the information ac-
companying the legislation.
b) The effects of this legislation are calculated by the same agency, the Treasury, that also
prepares the legislation in question.
Problem 8.
In the present arrangement, the Government is allowed to record certain liabilities below
the line. This distorts the real figure for the fabbisogno, and creates a large discrepancy
between the stock of debt and the sum of past fabbisogni.
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3.4.2 Proposals.
We believe that the past experience of the budget process has taught a very clear lesson:
a strict and detailed regulation is no cure to the type of creative accounting emphasized
above. If anything, it exacerbates the distortions that induce creative accounting.
The solution to problem 5 is clear: the budget must include all those agencies whose
deficit falls outside the current definition of the SNF. We believe that no amount of regula-
tion will ever alleviate this problem: nothing short of a budget on the Public Sector, which
includes local governments, will ever put a stop to the practice of shifting expenditure and
debt off the budget. The Maastricht Treaty recommends a less inclusive budget, on the
General Government rather than the Public Sector. The former excludes those agencies
providing market services, like the Post Office, the Telephone Company, and the Railways,
on the ground that they are normally financed without recourse to public debt. However,
this is clearly not a good assumption in the current Italian situation, given the standard
practice of bailing out these agencies by budgeting large transfers from the SS every few
years.
Of course, we are aware that such a budget would pose large technical problems. We
discuss briefly these problems in the next section. Here, we emphasize that it might be more
useful to concentrate the debate and scarce resources on tackling these technical problems,
rather than taking them as given and resorting to all sorts of ineffective regulations in order
to overcome them.
We emphasize that the AC budget should not only be accompanied by a budget covering
a larger definition, but it should simply be eliminated. The reason is that one should not
provide the media and politicians with the opportunity to focus on figures on, say, the AC
deficit which, in the current Italian situation, are practically meaningless from an economic
point of view. Because the public, the media, and even many members of Parliament
would not have sufficient information to fully understand, or would have an incentive to
manipulate, the difference between alternative definitions, they would be constantly coping
with different figures for the seemingly same phenomenon, like the deficit, and the resulting
debate would be even more confusing.
Similarly, problem 6 - the incentives to effectively postpone expenditures or anticipate
revenues - cannot be solved by further regulation. As long as the budget can record the
savings of future, non-existing legislation, there will always be an incentive to resolve the
conflicting claims on the budget by simply referring to unreasonable future budget-saving
measures. Of course, at present this problem is compounded by the fact that, because of the
limits discussed above, the LF must refer to future legislation in order for the Government
18Thus, we believe that even those agencies that have been incorporated, like the Ferrovie dello Stato,
but still receive large and systematic transfers from the Government, should be part of the Budget.
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to carry out its fiscal manoeuvre.
Therefore, in our view the solution to problem 6 is fairly straightforward: quite simply,
the Budget should not be allowed to make any reference to the effects of future legislation,
whether already presented in parliament or not. At the same time, however, following
proposal 2, the Budget must be allowed to incorporate any measure the Government deems
necessary to achieve the target fabbisogno.
The solution to problem 7 lies in subjecting the forecasts and the evaluations of the RGS
to some form of scrutiny. Rather than creating a new Government agency that supervises
and controls the RGS, we believe the solution is the same we stated in proposal 4. The
forecasts used to evaluate these effects must be derived form international organizations
or forecasting firms. Also, the budget effects of new legislation must be calculated by an
independent agency or, if one believes that the RGS might have informational advantages,
must at least be verified by independent agencies. This must apply to all types of inter-
ventions, whether they increase or decrease expenditure and taxation. However, to prevent
an excessive cluttering of the legislative process, this obligation might apply only to those
interventions whose projected savings exceed a certain minimum amount.
Finally, the solution of problem 8 too is conceptually very simple: all debt of the Public
Administration should be accounted for when computing the fabbisogno. In our view, this
is the only acceptable practice if the fabbisogno has to retain any macroeconomic meaning,
as a measure of the savings absorbed by the public sector. Note also that proposal 5 also
drastically reduces the opportunities and incentives to write debt below the line.
In practice, of course, difficulties are likely to arise due to the fact that it might not
always be clear what exactly constitutes a liability of the public sector. For instance, tech-
nically speaking the crediti d'imposta are liabilities only once they are recognized as such,
which my even require passing an ad hoc legislation. We believe that these technical issues
are relatively minor: for instance, in the case of securities issued by the CDP there can be
no doubt that they constitute a liability. In any case, for the more dubious cases one could
envision a system whereby all liabilities, including all crediti d'imposta, must be treated
the same way in the budget. An eventual exception must be justified by the RGS, and this
justification must be certified by one or more independent agencies.
Proposal 5.
The AC budget should be eliminated. All budget figures should cover the Public Sector.
Proposal 6.
No part of the Budget can refer to expenditure cuts or tax increases in any piece of legisla-




a) Any piece of budget legislation is inadmissible if it is not accompanied by a document
explaining the assumption behind its projected effects.
b) The effects must be calculated by an independent agency, outside the Public Adminis-
tration. If this is not possible, the evaluations of the RGS or of the Technical Services of
the two Chambers must be certified by one or more independent agencies.
Proposal 8.
All new liabilities of the public sector must be counted as part of the fabbisogno. Eventual
exceptions must be justified by the RGS and certified by one or more independent agencies.
3.5 The need for more accountability and expenditure controls.
3.5.1 The problems.
An important, but little appreciated, feature of the present system is its emphasis on
aggregate balances, like the SNF and fabbisogno, as measures of the budget stance. As we
have argued above, the process that leads to these target balances is a sure recipe for creative
accounting. But there is a second drawback: when it comes to deciding the measures
needed to achieve the target balances, no distinction is drawn between expenditure cuts
and tax increases. However, from a macroeconomic perspective expenditure cuts and tax
increases can have very different effects, on both the economy and the likelihood of success
of the fiscal adjustment (see Alesina and Perotti (1994 and 1995c). As a simple, but
important, example, an increase in labor and social security taxes to meet a certain target
fabbisogno is likely to lead to a fall in competitiveness, as wages increase to compensate
for the higher taxes. However, the same improvement in the fabbisogno, achieved with a
cut in redistributive expenditures or public wages, is likely to lead to an improvement in
competitiveness, as wage claims in other sectors of the economy also remain moderate.
However, the present system is heavily biased towards tax increases, rather than ex-
penditure cuts. The complicated and contrived structure of the budget process (Problems
1 and 2) and the tendency to set targets for the SNF and fabbisogno without an adequate
consideration of the planned interventions (Problem 4) imply that the target SNF and
fabbisogno can usually be achieved only by resorting heavily to creative accounting and to
last-minute, emergency legislation. Clearly, significant and lasting expenditure cuts cannot
be studied, decided and implemented in an emergency situation and under pressing time
constraints. The only feasible action is to increase tax rates, or to resort to once-off levies.
It should therefore come as no surprise that the last part of the budget session, as well as
most of the Bilancio d'Assestamento, are usually all taken up by tax measures The debate
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on the 1995 LF and the midyear fiscal manoeuvre of 1995 are good examples of this. After
plans for a pension reform were scrapped in the fall of 1995, the Government had to hastily
rewrite the LF, and focused heavily on tax increases. Out of the 20,000bn of deficit re-
duction in the midyear fiscal manoeuvre of 1995, 15,000bn were the result of tax increases.
The remaining 5,000bn were just a shifting of debt off-budget, to local governments.
Making the budget process more amenable to expenditure controls and expenditure
cuts requires three crucial preconditions.
1) It must be possible to match closely an expenditure with the subject that bears resposi-
bility for that expenditure.
2) It must be possible to impose cash limits, and to enforce them.
3) There must be a unified direction for all phases of the budget process, that can internalize
the macroeconomic constraints and reconcile conflicting claims on budget resources.
In this section we address the first two issues. We analyze the third issue in the next
section.
As many observers have note (see in particular Onofri, Pisauro and Siniscalco (1994)
and Giarda (1995)), in the current system it is often difficult, if not impossible, to match
an expenditure with the subject that ultimately bears responsibility for it. For instance,
the budget of the Treasury Minister contains scores of items for which the expenditure
resposibility lies in different ministries. This has two consequences. First, in many cases,
it is very difficult to locate precisely the programs that are responsible for expenditure
over-runs, and therefore the areas where intervention is needed. Second, it is very difficult
to determine exactly who should bear the accountability of expenditure for each program.
Cash limits obviously make sense only if a reliable cash budget exists. Although now
the LF and LB also contain a cash budget, much more is needed for the implementation
of cash limits on expenditure, for the following reasons:
a) at present, carry-overs from the previous years become known only in March. Thus,
when Parliament passes the LB and LF, the cash budget is in reality still in a sort of
limbo;
b) the Treasury Account has a considerable leeway in changing the availability of cash
resources to different programs, in particular through a clever reshuffling of the "giacenze
di tesoreria" between different programs;
c) there are enormous problems in tracking the cash budgets of almost any agency outside
the SS, in particular local governments and USL;
d) the cash forecasts of Enti di Previdenza, in particular INPS, have in the past repeatedly
proven surprisingly off the mark.
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These are the same problems that also hamper the enforceability of cash expenditure
limits: as long as the cash budget of the Public Sector is uncertain and flexible, it is im-
possible to enforce any mechanism that limits spending.
Problem 9.
The complexities of the budget process and the tendency to set targets for the SNF and
fabbisogno without an adequate consideration of the planned interventions heavily skew
the fiscal manoeuvre towards tax increases rather than expenditure cuts.
Problem 10.
A crucial prerequisite for expenditure controls is the establishment of a reliable cash bud-
get. However, because in the present arrangement spending responsibilities are often not
matched with programs in the budget, it is impossible to establish end enforce cash controls
and limits. A reliable cash budget is also precluded by other practices, in particular:
a) the uncertainty generated by carry-overs;
b) the use of "giacenze" by the Treasury;
c) the lack of reliable cash forecasts of local governments, USL, and other decentralized
agencies;
d) the often sub-standard cash forecasts of Enti di Previdenza, in particular INPS.
3.5.2 Proposals.
The common element to the problems pointed out in this section is that the system needs
to be reoriented towards expenditure controls and cuts.
The solution to problem 9 is clear: among the binding targets discussed and voted in
the Budget, one should have not only an overall balance like the fabbisogno, but also a
target figure for expenditures, broken down into different types of expenditures. In order to
avoid the phenomenon of capital expenditures being cut in order to make room for current
expenditure, the Budget should contain limits on capital expenditure and on those types
of current expenditure that are not open-ended entitlements (which by their nature cannot
be cash-limited).
The solution to Problem 10 is a cash budget by cost centers, as has been advocated
and proposed, among others, by the Commissione Tecnica per la Spesa Pubblica and Gi-
arda (1995). This last contribution also contains a detailed and informed analysis of the
problems and the existing proposals.
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The technical problems associated with the construction of a cash budget for the Public
Sector, some of which are listed in Problem 10, may seem daunting. However, in our view
this is the area where the returns could prove to be the greatest. Whether or not one
endorses the idea of a cash budget for the Public Sector as the only budget, being able
to forecast and budget the cash expenditure of local governments and Enti di Previdenza
seems a long overdue necessity. To this end, and given the past performances of INPS in
forecasting its outlays, it might be necessary to require that cash forecasts of decentralized
agencies be certified by independent agencies. In addition, we believe that carry-overs for
current expenditure should simply be eliminated: any amount committed but not spend
should become a budget savings. We also favor a much more limited use of the giacenze
di Tesoreria. To this end, every program should have its own account, with very limited
or no possibility to compensate overruns in one program with unused giacenze in another
program. Rather, the initial overruns in a program should be met by a contingency reserve
fund; after a certain point, the cash limit should kick in. We are aware that this proposal
would reduce the efficiency of the cash management at the Treasury Account. However,
given that the reshuffling of giacenze has often been used as a gimmick to formally meet
a certain target fabbisogno, we tgink that this is a cost that has to be paid for a more
transparent budget process. In addition, other proposals that we make strongly reduce
the incentives for entities outside the State Sector to borrow and increase their giacenze
at the Treasury; thus, the scope and the size of the phenomenon of giacenze would greatly
diminish to start with.
Proposal 9.
The Budget should be in cash as well as commitment terms. It should contain targets not
only on the fabbisogno, but also on different types of expenditure. It should be based on
cost centers, and should involve a drastic reduction in the current number of Capitoli.
Proposal 10.
a) carry-overs for current expenditure should be abolished;
b) each program should have a separate account at the Treasury, with very limited or no
trasnfer of cash resources across programs;
c) possibly the single most important goal of the RGS in the near future should be the
improvement of the data collection system for local governments, USL and other decen-
tralized agencies, in order to be able to consruct a reliable cash budget for the General
Government in a relatively showrt period of time;
d) the cash forecasts of Enti Previdenziali should be entrusted to or certified by an inde-
penent agency.
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3.6 The Government and the Budget Preparation.
3.6.1 The problems.
An important reason why it is difficult to control and cut expenditure, as opposed to
increasing taxes, is the absence of a unified direction during the various phases of the budget
process. While tax increases cannot be "attributed" to any particular ministry, expenditure
cuts are always more specific. Therefore, they require the direction of an agent that can
allocate the burden of fiscal retrenchment to the various ministers. However, the current
budget process is, in the terminology of section 2, too "collegial", along two dimensions.
First, currently three ministers (Treasury, Finance, and Budget) share responsibility for
the process, with only a marginal prominence for the Treasury minister. Thus, there is no
single minister that internalizes the macroeconomic constraints and takes responsibility for
resolving conflicting claims on the budget's resources.
Second, the bargaining process between spending ministers and the other three minis-
ters (and the Treasury minister in particular), a critical process that leads to the drafting of
the LF, is somewhat unregulated. The Treasury minister is often unable to limit the claims
on the budget from spending ministers. An important example is the recent disagreement
between the Labour and the Treasury ministers on the reform of the Italian pension sys-
tem, in the 1994 budget session. As a result of the unregulated bargaining process and the
relatively high (by international standards) influence of spending ministers 19 the Treasury
minister does not have enough strength to overrule objections to its position.
Problem 11.
The responsibility for the budget process is dispersed between 3 ministries. Thus, there is no
single agnet at the center of the process that can internalize the macroeconomic constraints.
Problem 12.
The relationship between the ministries in charge of the budget (in particular, the Treasury
minister) and the spending ministers is too collegial and unstructured. The system lacks a
way to limit and reconcile conflicting claims on the budget from spending ministers.
3.6.2 Proposals.
The budget process has to be made "authoritarian", particularly in view of the major
fiscal adjustment that Italy will have to undergo in the next decade. Our proposals aim at
reducing the collegiality of the process along both dimensions pointed out above.
19On this point, see Von Hagen (1992).
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First, we do not see the need for three ministers dealing with the budget. After all,
given the identity: Deficit = Spending - Revenues, one of the three is determined as a resid-
ual! We have already discussed our objections to the outdated notions of macroeconomic
management and planning embedded in the Budget ministry. Because at best it does not
seem to be doing anything useful, this ministry should certainly be abolished. In our view,
even the tasks currently carried out by the Finance ministry can be taken over by the
Treasury. Thus, we propose the elimination of the Budget and of the Finance ministries.
The Treasury minister should have sole responsibility for all budget issues. This would
include preparing all budget documents, preparing the Bilancio tendenziale, setting target
values for the fabbisogno and expenditure, handling the budget debate, and reconciling
conflicting claims on budget resources from the spending ministers.
Second, in order to limit the influence of the spending ministers, the prerogatives of
the Treasury Minister have to be clearly specified. We believe that, in defining this crucial
aspect of the reform, one should have a "long horizon". While a high-debt country might
need particularly authoritarian budget institutions, more stringent checks and balances
should be reinstated when fiscal responsibility is achieved. Thus, in order to optimize over
the trade-off between authoritarian and collegial rules, we propose below to adopt two dif-
ferent procedures. More authoritarian procedures would apply when the debt/GDP ratio is
beyond a certain threshold, for instance 60%, as in the Maastricht criterion. More collegial
rules would apply when the debt/GDP ratio is below this threshold. This simple structure
would have two significant benefits. First, it permits to benefit from the different types of
procedures when they are most needed. Second, it creates the correct incentives for those
who typically favor deficits to restrain themselves when the debt /GDP ratio approaches
the threshold. Thus, we propose:
Proposal 11.
The Finance and Budget Ministries are abolished. Their functions are taken over by the
Treasury Ministry. The Treasury Minister has sole responsibility with the whole budget
process. In particular, he opens the budget preparation process by proposing to the Cabi-
net Ministers the overall balance, total spending and total revenues.
Proposal 12.
Depending on the level of the debt/GDP ratio, two procedures regulate the relationship
between the Treasury minister and the spending ministers. When the debt/GDP ratio is
above a certain threshold (for instance, 60%):
1) The target level of spending and surplus proposed by the Treasury minister cannot be
relaxed during the budget preparation process;
2) Negotiations over the composition of spending are bilateral between the Treasury min-
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ister and the spending ministers;
3) The composition of the budget is approved by majority voting at the end of the process
by the Council of Ministers but the Treasury minister has veto power.
If the debt/GDP ratio is below the threshold, the previous rules are modified as follows:
1) The targets on spending and deficits proposed by the Treasury minister can be relaxed
by a two-thirds majority of the Council of Ministers;
2) As above;
3) As above, except that the veto power of the Treasury minister is eliminated.
3.7 The Legislative Approval Process.
3.7.1 The problems.
Among experts of the Italian budget process, there seems to be deep disagreement con-
cerning the effects of the Parliament's responsibility on the current Italian fiscal disaster.
Currently, Parliament can increase current expenditures relative to the Government pro-
posal as long as they are covered by increases in revenues. Also, if the SNF in the Gov-
ernment proposal is already close to the SNF in the DPEF, Parliament is also effectively
limited in its ability to affect the overall SNF. Some 20 argue that, particularly in recent
years, Parliament has rarely, if ever at all, worsened the balance in the LF relative to the
original Government proposal. Others 21 argue that Parliament bears a large share of
responsibility. This issue is difficult to resolve: it is true that Parliament has had minimal
impacts both on the balances and even on the composition of expenditure and revenues
(see De Joanna (1993), Appendix for some evidence on this point). However, this might
simply reflect the fact that the Government proposals already take into account the likely
response by Parliament, for instance by avoiding proposing budget cuts with little likeli-
hood of success. In fact, regardless of whether the Italian Parliament has actually relaxed
fiscal discipline relative to the Government's proposals in recent years, we believe that Par-
liament's prerogatives to increase spending pose a threat to the feasibility of a tight fiscal
stance based on spending cuts.
While we propose below to limit the extent of Parliamentary amendments, our propos-
als to radically simplify the budget process will greatly enhance the role of Parliament as
an informed controller of the Government. Currently, in fact, the cumbersome budget pro-
cedures greatly reduce the amount of clear and usable information available to Parliament.
Thus, we identify two problems:
20See in particular Onofri, Pisauro and Siniscalco (1994).
21See in particular Ragioneria Generale dello Stato (1994).
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Problem 13.
Parliament can increase spending above the Government proposal.
Problem 14.
A cumbersome procedure limits the ability of Parliament to effectively monitor the Gov-
ernment's actions.
3.7.2 Proposals.
Regarding the issue of Parliamentary amendments, once again one has to trade-off the
advantages of authoritarian and collegial institutions. In high-debt situations, the benefits
of authoritarian procedures outweigh those of checks and balances. In low-debt situations,
the opposite holds. Thus, we believe that in this area too different procedures should be
adopted for high- and low-debt periods.
The purpose of the proposal we make below is to attribute stronger powers to the
Government in periods of fiscal emergency. The proposal also raises the stakes of a Parlia-
mentary rejection, by forcing the Government to resign in case the Budget does not pass.
Legislators of the parties supporting the Government would know that, in case they defected
and voted against the budget, they would also threaten the survival of the Government
itself. Also, the proposal creates a stringent status quo for delays in budget approval.
The solution to problem 14 is contained in our previous proposals that vastly simplify
the budget process. This would greatky enhance the ability of Parliament to monitor the
Government on the basis of an informed representation of the fiscal manoeuvre.
Proposal 13.
When the debt/GDP ratio is above the 60% threshold:
1) At the beginning of the process the legislature votes on the budget balance and the
level of spending and taxation. A two-thirds majority is required to reject the Government
proposal on the budget size. A closed rule is adopted: no amendments are allowed on the
size of the budget.
2) If the Government proposal is rejected the Government is required to resign.
3) If the Government resigns the legislature has to adopt a budget with an automatic cut
of evey Capitolo of expenditure of five percent relative to the previous year, after adjusting
all expenditures by the expected inflation rate. When a new Government is formed, it has
to follow the same procedures described above to prepare a budget proposal, but with an
accelerated schedule.
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4) If the budget is approved, the legislative discussion begins. The legilsature cannot pro-
pos amendments that increase the level of spending, or increase the level of the deficit.
5) Amendments are approved by simple majority rule.
6) When no more amendments are presented, or at the prescribed last possible day (whichever
comes first), the legislature takes a vote (with a simple majority rule) on the budget com-
position. If the budget is rejected, the original budget proposed by the Government is
adopted.
When the debt/GDP ratio is below the threshold level, these rules should be modified
as follows:
1) As above, except that a simple majority is required to reject the Government proposal.
2) Deleted: the Government must propose a revised budget with accelerated procedure.
3) Does not apply.
4) The legislature cannot propose amendments that increase the size of the deficit, or re-




The simplification of the budget process that would be brought about by proposals 1 to 10
greatly enhances the ability of Parliament to monitor the Government.
3.8 Budget Implementation and Spending Controls.
3.8.1 The Problems.
An exhaustive discussion of the implementation of the budget would require an analysis of
the organization and reform of the bureaucracy, a task which goes beyond the scope of the
present paper. However, we think that a few points are in order.
Currently, the emphasis of bureaucratic control is on ex-post interventions and on a
legalistic approach. The typical example of this is, of course, the current role of the Corte dei
Conti. This body has, on paper, fairly substantial powers. For instance, every four months
it must transmit a technical note on every piece of legislation that increases expenditure
or decreases revenues. These notes, however, only express the Court's position on the
legislation, but are not binding. Moreover, the timing is obviously awkward if the purpose
is to impose budget discipline.
One solution, advocated by many, 22 is to further enhance the role of the Corte dei
22See, for instance, Ragioneria Generate dello Stato (1994) and our discussion in section 6.
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Conti, by anticipating the timing of its intervention. Even if this were feasible, a host of
questions remain open. What happens if the Government and the Corte dei Conti are on
two different position regarding the legitimacy of a certain budget item? How is the conflict
resolved? What power would the Court have to enforce its position? These issues have to
be denned very precisely, to avoid a lengthy stalemate on one side, and the possibility of
loopholes on the other. Yet, to our knowledge, these issues have never been addressed with
the precision they require.
Thus, we do not believe in the idea of entrusting the realization of a greater budget
discipline to a very detailed regulation of the role of a watchdog of the Government and
Parliament, however qualified it might be. This approach inspires the whole current budget
process, and it is obvious that it has failed.
Problem 15.
The whole philosophy of the budget process is based on detailed regulation of a cumber-
some process. This inevitably leads to a widespread use of irregular practices aimed at
circumventing the regulations and at taking advantage of the lack of transparency of the
system. In turn, the current process is heaviliy biased towards ex-post controls to check
these practices.
3.8.2 Proposals.
More generally, we think that the entire philosophy of budget implementation and controls
should change: from an "ex-post approach", based on detailed regulations and controls,
to an "ex-ante approach", based on incentives. In fact, the spirit of all our proposals was
to decrease the opportunities for Government and Parliament to do the "wrong" things
when preparing and discussing the budget, and to increase the incentives to do the "right"
things.
But we think that this idea should go a step further. It should also apply to the
implementation of the budget, down to the final link of the chain. Ex post, legalistic
controls are unlikely to be successful, particularly if applied to a bureaucracy with job
security, whose salaries and careers are virtually unaffected by performance, and almost
exclusively determined by seniority.
To be effective, a reform of the budget process which, like ours, is based mostly on the
idea of controlling expenditure, must be coupled with a system of bureaucratic incentives
for cost containment. A system of incentives could generally work as follows. Each office or
department of the bureaucracy should work on contracts which specify certain output at
given costs. Salaries, promotions and job security should be linked to a successful delivery
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of the output specified in the contract.
A more detailed specification of proposals for a bureaucratic reform of this sweeping
magnitude goes beyond the scope of this paper. However, in the next section we briefly
describe the salient features of a recent reform in New Zealand, which has taken decisive
steps exactly in this direction.
Proposal 15.
The whole philosophy of the budget process should shift from heavy regulation and ex-post
controls to simplification and ex-ante incentives.
4 Lessons from New Zealand.
Starting in the mid-eighties, New Zealand has gone through a process of dramatic insti-
tutional reforms, second only to reforms in Eastern Europe. These reforms have included
trade liberalization, fiscal reforms, a new Central Bank law, and a major reform in bureau-
cratic procedures and in the budget process.
The budget reform, introduced in 1988 and completed in 1994 with the Fiscal Re-
sponsibility Act, is an imaginative and sweeping attempt at restructuring the bureaucratic
organization. They key idea of the reform has been a move from a system of 'input control'
to one of 'output control'. The relationships, top to bottom, between various levels of bu-
reaucracies and departments is based upon contract-like agreements prescribing the delivery
of a prespecified output. The goal was to structure the bureaucracy as much as possible
as a large private company. The Government is viewed both as an owner of the agency
(i.e., bureaucratic bodies) interested in the efficient use of resources, and a purchasers of
prespecified outputs at certain prices. The goals of this radical reform were to increase the
efficiency of the bureaucracy, leading to substantial cuts in government spending for given
delivery of services, and to increase the transparency of the budget process.
The main aspects of the reform in New Zealand, and, specifically, those more relevant
for Italy can be summarized as follows: 23
• Each Minister is responsible for specifying the performance of his Chief Executive Office;
a contract-like agreement establishes the output expected by the Chief Executive; in turn,
he is responsible for guiding his bureaucracy toward the achievement of this output goal.
• The Chief Executives do not have permanent tenure. They are appointed every five
years. Their performance, based upon output delivery is evaluated every year. Bonuses
and discretionary salary increases rewards good performance that may also lead to the
23For an excellent description of the New Zealand reform see Scott (1995).
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renewal of the contract for three additional years.
• The Chief Executives are freed from almost all inputs controls and have a vast authority
in using financial and human resources to deliver the output prescribed by their perfor-
mance agreement with the Ministers.
• The Chief Executive Officers are, by law, the employing authority of all their subordi-
nates. Labor regulations within the bureaucracy are very similar to those in the private
sector. For instance, department heads can negotiate performance pay agreements and
bonuses with individual bureaucrats and pay cuts are allowed for poor performances.
• Performance information at various levels of the bureaucracy is gathered in a very de-
centralized system and centralized by a Strategic Human Resource Manager Center which
is supposed to enhance competence-based approaches to hiring, firing and personnel devel-
opment.
• The entire focus of the management system, linking departments and sub-departments
are outcomes, rather than inputs; this focus on the delivery of outputs "required the re-
moval of extensive webs of controls over internal management decision making and the use
of inputs" (Scott (1995) p. 44). The critical point of the output approach is that an Agency
or Department takes full responsibility for delivery of an output, at a certain 'price' with
prespecified penalties and rewards and performance evaluation.
• A bureaucratic output is anything that can be contracted for by the Department or
Agency as a supplier to the Government, or third parties, as a purchaser. Output should
be "individually unique, internally homogeneous, capable of being costed and not involving
a large element of overlap with other outputs." (Scott (1995) page 44.)
Given the critical role played by outputs in this bureaucratic reforms, one needs to
pause to consider two critical issues. First, outputs do not coincide with outcomes. For in-
stance, in public health an 'output' is the number of hospital beds over the population size;
an 'outcome' is an improvement in health statistics. Since the Government is ultimately
interested in outcomes, rather than outputs, an even more radical reform would estab-
lish outcomes based managerial criteria for bureaucratic Agencies and Departments. The
problem is, that too much uncertainty and random shocks affect the relationship between
output and outcomes, and it would be difficult to enforce penalties based upon outcomes.
A second major problem involves the definition of outputs, particularly when quality is
a critical factor and when costs of output production are very uncertain. Output based
content create incentives for the bureaucracy to reduce quality. The solutions to this prob-
lem include: 1) specification of quality controls within the contract, whenever possible;
ii) promotion of competition amongst public agencies and with private suppliers whenever
possible. Uncertain costs can be dealt with, at least up to a point, with contingent contract
specifying acceptable ranges and schedule of penalties for deviations from the range.
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• The government budget is presented using the same format of the budget of a large
private corporation;
• The Treasury Minister maintains a leading and critical role in the budget preparation
process;
• The Government has to present three months before the beginning of the fiscal year (July
1) a "Budget Policy Statement" which illustrates simply and concisely the guidelines of the
upcoming budget.
• The Parliament scrutinizes the budget along three dimensions, as summarized by Scott
(1995):
i) scrutiny of the Government's intentions for the current years as expressed in its budget
proposals,
ii) examination of the actual performance of departments or reported in their annual reports
iii) examination of the performance of state owned enterprises and other nondepartmental
government entities.
The emphasis of the scrutiny is a comparison of actual performance with planned per-
formance.
• In December, the Government has to provide a half-year Economic and Fiscal update.
As the reader may have noted, several of these points are similar to those contained
in our proposals. It is still relatively early to judge the results of this broad reform.
Reviewers have pointed out areas which need 'fine tuning', in particular tightening of
output definitions. Also, some commentators feel that too much autonomy is granted to
the chief Executives. 24 However, overall the reform looks like a success. The transparency
of the process has greatly increased and "expenditures for operating activities for the fiscal
year which ended in June 30, 1992 ... declined by 1.5 billions NZ dollars, on a base of 31
billions." (Scott (1995), p. 100.)
There is one critical lesson for Italy from this reform experience. Complicated webs of
controls by bureaucrats over other bureaucrats, where salary or promotion incentives are
minimal or nonexistant, will never improve efficiency and save money. Incentive schemes
need to substitute for excruciating, complicated and ultimately useless procedures of con-
trols. One should reward and punish civil servants at every level for the delivery of output,
and let them relatively free to optimize over the use of resources available to them.
24See Scott (1995) p. 100 on this point.
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5 Two Recent Reform Proposals for the Italian Bud-
get Process.
5.1 The Proposal of the Ragioneria Generale Dello Stato.
This proposal touches upon all critical aspects of the budget process:
1) The budget preparation: including the structure of government, the relationship government -
parliament, the budget presentation and its transparency; 2) The budget implementation:
with particular emphasis on the issue of control of the public administration.
As for the budget preparation, the proposal focuses on four issues:
1.1) Restructuring of Government composition;
l.b) Reform of the budget document;
l.c) The voting process in the Parliament on the budget;
l.d) Reorganization of the Ragioneria.
For the budget implementation, the proposal sketches a rather complex web of bureaucratic
controls.
5.1.1 Restructuring of Government Composition.
The proposal suggests that:
a) The number of ministers should be fixed by law and reduced to nine. In particular, the
functions of the Ministro del Bilancio and of Ministro delle Finanze should be incorporated
within the single Ministro del Tesoro e dell'Economia.
b) The number of Segretari and Sottosegretari is at the discretion of every government; so
for instance, the Ministro del Tesoro could have a Segretario del Bilancio, one of Finanza
and as many others as the government sees fit.
Comments.
This proposal goes in the right direction by unifying the supervision of the budget process
within a single Minister. 25 However, by letting the number of Secretaries unspecified, it
may lead to a multiplication of them, with the possible effect of watering down the central-
ization of the budget process which is the original aim of this part of the proposal. Also,
the proposal is silent on the intragovernment procedures for the budget preparation and
discussion. For instance, it is not specified what kind of veto power the Ministro del Tesoro,
would have vis a vis spending ministers. More generally the proposal does not explicitly
25We disagree with the name attributed to this minister. We suggest simply "Ministro del Tesoro". The
addendum "dell'Economia" suggests a view of government control and planning over the economy which
is unnecessary.
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attribute a leading role to the Ministro del Tesoro in the budget formation process.
5.1.2 Reform of the Budget Law.
The proposal suggests the institutions of two budgets: a "Bilancio Politico" and a "Bilancio
Amministrativo". The former, organized in broad aggregations of expenditures, is approved
by Parliament. This budget identifies for each chapter of expenditure the share which can
be executed only after "corresponding resources'" are obtained. The latter, much more
detailed, is shown to Parliament only at "scopo conoscitivo", but is not voted upon.
The proposal also suggests a variety of points which have several goals. First, on the
revenue side, a clarification in the presentation of what are truly fiscal revenues, and what
is an increase in debt. Second, a clear identification of the revenues items which are "una
tantum" rather than permanent. Third, elimination of "special funds", to cover various
additional spending programs, within each fiscal year. Fourth, measures directed to prevent
strategic manipulation of multi-year spending programs to create room for new expendi-
tures.
Comments.
The motivation of this part of the proposal is laudable: simplification. However, the
proposal stops way too short of the needed more radical restructuring of the budget prepa-
ration. The proposal does not deal with the relationship between "Legge Finanziaria",
"Bilancio Tendenziale" and "Bilancio Programmatico". That is, it does not provide enough
indications for a more general simplification and clarification of the entire process. For in-
stance, it does not address the issue of how the bilancio Tendenziale is formed, under which
assumptions, whether this document is needed, whether it should be used as a benchmark
etc. It does not address the issue of how economic projections needed to evaluate the
macroeconomic consequence of the budget are formulated.
5.1.3 Voting Rules in the Parliament.
The proposal is that the Parliament should not be allowed to amend the Government's
budget. Not only the Parliament should not increase spending or cut taxes, but it should
not even change the budget composition. Using the terminology used in our theoretical
section, the proposal is to adopt a "closed rule" in the budget approval process.
Comments.
This proposal does not show enough appreciation of the issue of constitutional "checks
40
and balances" and of the trade off between what we called above "authoritarian" and
"collegial" procedures. The proposal is extremely "authoritarian". While this procedure
may be appropriate in a "fiscal emergency" it is unlikely to be optimal for a "normal"
situation. In other words, this proposal is too influenced by the current state of Italian
public finance. Institutions cannot and should not be changed too frequently, thus an
institutional reform should "optimize" over a horizon which is not unduly influenced by a
specific situation. This proposal also places much of the blame on the current state of the
Italian public finances on the Parliament. One can argue, however, that much of the blame
lies within the government, in the bureaucracy and in the administration of the pension
system. By focusing too much attention on the Parliament per se, one may miss the critical
role of the other parties involved.
Equally importantly, the proposal is silent on the issue of what happens if Parliament
rejects the budget proposed by the Government. As we argued above, this is a crucial issue:
we consider it a mistake to leave it open to ambiguity and different interpretations.
5.1.4 Reorganization of the Ragioneria.
This part of the proposal, rather involved and rich of organizational details, is inspired by
two basic principles: 1) Greater independence of the Ragioneria from political influence;
and 2) The central role of the Ragioneria in the entire budget process, including its imple-
mentation.
Comments .
We fully agree with the principle of greater independence of the Ragioneria, following the
model of independent Central Banks. In fact, in some respect, the proposal does not go far
enough in guaranteeing independence. For instance, Article 3 of the proposal states that
the Ragioniere can be dismissed by a simple majority (50 percent -f 1) of the Council of
Ministers. This requirement does not seem stringent enough; a qualified majority, or even
unanimity, seems more appropriate. As for an increase in the power of the Ragioneria, we
feel that the proposal underestimates (perhaps strategically) the current critical role of this
institution. The entire budget process begins with the "Bilancio Tendenziale" prepared by
the Ragioneria. This document sets the stage for everything which follows. As we argued
above, the criteria which lead to the formulation of this document are not sufficiently clear
and transparent. In other words, the Ragioneria's influence derive on a quasi-monopoly
of information and expertise of even the most obscure corners of the budget. More inde-
pendence and an increasing role of the Ragioneria should be coupled with i) a substantial
increase in the transparency of the budget; ii) an increase in the resources available to
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the Parliament to gather information. The model of the American Congressional Budget
Office might be a good example to follow. In other words, the authority and prestige of the
Ragioneria should not emerge from its monopoly on information on a cumbersome process,
but from its reputation of independent technical agency supervising the preparation of a
transparent easy to interpret budget.
5.1.5 Controls of Budget Execution and of Local Government Finances.
The proposal suggests a reorganization of the control procedures and envision a complex
web of two bodies of controllers: the "Controllori Finanziari" and the "Contabili Pubblici".
The former are controlled by a "permanent commission" within the Treasury Minister. The
latter are controlled by "Ispettorato Generale della Finanza". An additional body of public
accountants would supervise and certify the budget of local governments. These accoun-
tants would constitute a new "Ente" called "Ente Nazionale Di Certificazione E Valutazione
Pubblica". These accountants would be supervised by a Commission of thirteen members.
26
 This new system of control would not substitute the role of the Corte Dei Conti. The
proposal goes on specifying in fine details the role of each of these controllers.
Comments.
We totally disagree with the spirit of this part of the proposal. We feel that this is precisely
the wrong way to go, if the goal is to improve the efficiency and accountability of the Italian
bureaucracy. The proposal is based on something that looks like a "Reductio ad Infini-
tum" of 'controlled' and 'controllers' within the same bureaucracy. As we argued above, we
should instead think about using reputable private accounting firms to certify the accuracy
of the budgets of local governments, or even of branches of the Central administration.
More importantly, the proposal is completely insensitive to the idea of introducing market
oriented ideas into the bureaucracy. Rather than creating an excruciatingly complex web
of controls on budgets produced by bureaucrats who cannot be fired and whose salaries
are totally unrelated to performance, one should go in the direction of creating incentives
for the bureaucracy to work efficiently and honestly. The example of New Zealand, which
we described above, provides an excellent example of how to go in the direction opposite
to the one taken by the "ragioneria". In summary, what we find rather disappointing in
this part of the proposal is its complete impermeability to any ideas of incentives at work
within the bureaucracy.
26Members of this commission would include entrepreneurs and union members. We find this idea
rather peculiar: what do union member and entrepreneurs have to do with certifying he accounts of local
governments?
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5.2 The Proposal of the "Technical Commission".
This proposal 2T focuses one three areas:
1) Institutional constraints on spending increases;
2) Reorganization of the government structure;
3) Transparency of the budget.
5.2.1 Institutional Constraints on Expenditures.
On this point the proposal suggest various changes in the Constitution to and an improve-
ment on the procedures of control. As for the Constitutions, the proposal argues that:
"II quarto comma dell'articolo 81 Costituzione dovrebbe essere rafforzato escludendo per
qualsiasi componente della spesa statale, anche di investimento, l'indebitamento come
forma di copertura delle nuove o maggiori spese. Un tale vincolo, ovviamente, non com-
porterebbe l'obbligo di paraggio del bilancio. II saldo, infatti, subisce i riflessi della situ-
azione preesistente e, inoltre, puo' variare a causa dell'andamento spontaneo delle voci di
entrata e di spesa il cui ammontare non e' predeterminato dalle leggi."
The proposal also increases the role of the President of the Republic to challenge the Con-
stitutionality of spending programs.
As for the control procedures the proposals suggests, in particular that: a) the Corte
Dei Conti should be made capable of intervening much earlier, beginning during the budget
discussion in the Parliament; b) the role of controller of the Parliament should be increased
particularly with reference to calculations of the "bilancio tendenziale"; c) elimination
of financing means of current expenditures based upon future and uncertain increases of
revenues; d) stipulation that revenues from privatization cannot be used to finance expen-
ditures; e) changes in multi-year spending programs cannot increase expenditures; and f)
the ex-post verification of the Parliament on the budget implementation should become an
important moment of Parliamentary control.
Comments.
We are somewhat skeptical of the usefulness of Constitutional rules to limit spending. The
long quote which we reported above well captures our concerns. This quote begins with
some 'tough' language, but ends up with a 'soft' tone, explaining that the 'tough' language
does not mean, indeed, a balanced budget prescription. We feel that Constitutional rules
27As it appears in Onofri, Pisauro and Siniscalco (1994).
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like this one simply promote creative budgeting to circumvent them. As a result, they
achieve relatively little in terms of budget discipline, but decrease transparency. As a mat-
ter of fact, in the introduction of this proposal, one reads the following evaluation of the
current situation:
"Provando a dare una valutazione, il quadro complessivo dei vincoli sulle decisioni in ma-
teria di spesa apare alquanto stringente."
Despite these "vincoli ... stringenti" the Italian public finances are in total disarray. One
should also remember that entitlements (together with interest payments) have been, by
far, the fastest growing component of government outlays, not only in Italy but in virtually
all OECD economies. Thus, the proposed Constitutional rule imposes a tough constraint
on the least problematic part of the budget, leaving the rest untouched.
We note a striking difference between this proposal and that of the Ragioneria. The
Ragioneria wants to minimize the role of the Parliament in the entire budget process. This
proposal wants to reinforce the role of the Parliament as a controller, in the spirit of "checks
and balances". While we share the appreciation of the role of " checks and balances", we are
concerned about the proposed increase in the role of Parliament in the budget preparation
phase, both because it is most likely impractical and in light of our discussion of authori-
tarian vs. collegial rules.
5.2.2 The Structure of the Government.
This part of the proposal is based upon the view that most of the responsibility for the
Italian fiscal imbalance lies within the Government, not so much in the relationship be-
tween Government and parliament. Thus, while the proposal argues for reinforcing (by
means of a new Constitutional law, perhaps) the limits to the power of amendments of the
Parliament, it focuses mostly on the structure of government itself. The proposal has two
key ingredients: a) strengthening the position of the Prime Minister as the central player
in the budget preparation; and b) reorganization of the economic ministers, so that a single
minister has responsibility for overall spending and taxation.
Comments .
We agree with the spirit of this part of the proposal. The crucial point is, in our view, the
reinforcement of one minister who has the "political responsibility" of the budget, above the
spending ministers. The proposal views the Prime Minister, as the individual who should
have this responsibility. An alternative would be to make the single economic minister
(the Treasury minister) the one with the ultimate political responsibility of the budget.
As we argued above, we have some sympathy for this alternative for three reasons: a) the
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Prime Ministers may be more sensitive to short run electoral pressures, while the economic
minister may be relatively less sensitive, b) the Treasury Minister may have more technical
competence than the Prime Minister, or, at least, he should have, almost by definition;
and c) it may be useful for the Prime Minister to have a "scapegoat" and "blame" on the
Treasury Minister "tough" fiscal measures when necessary.
5.2.3 Transparency.
This part of the proposal suggests a variety of detailed improvements on the organiza-
tion of the budget, the most important of which can be summarized as follows: a) better
coordination of data and balances among the budget the "legge Finanziaria" the DPEF,
and multi-year projections, and more realistic evaluation of appropriations; b) inclusion
of "out of budget" activities, and in particular financing of Tesoreria to INPS within the
budget; c) coordination and correspondence between planned deficit and increase in the
stock of debt; d) budget restructuring so that all spending authorizations are allocated
within the responsibility of the Ministry with the political responsibility over them - this
would greatly reduce the role of the Treasury as a monopolist of information and budget
supervision; and e) better presentation and classification of the difference between capital
and current expenditures.
Comments.
Parts of this proposal go in the right direction in advocating more transparency in the
budget process. However, other parts read a bit too much as simple exhortations to "do a
better job". For instance:
"L'entita degli stanziamenti nella legge di bilancio va determinata senza artificiose sottova-
lutazioni dei costi delle leggi vigenti e senza artificiose sopravvalutazioni degli effetti delle
manovre."
What incentives would be introduced to improve the current situation on this point? As
we argued above, we feel that a more radical approach to simplification and transparency is
needed. More generally, while we feel that all of these proposals are quite sensible, partic-
ularly the elimination of "off budget" items, they do not go far enough. Finally, we do not
share the proposal's enthusiasm for multi-year budgets. Multi-year budget plans are often
a scapegoat, to justify delays on current adjustments, based on future budget projections
and promises of very little reliability. As we argued above, the role of multi-year budgeting
should be vastly de-emphasized. Note that, Von Hagen (1992) finds that in a sample of
OECD countries the extent of the use of multi year budgeting is totally uncorrelated to
the fiscal position of different countries.
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6 Conclusions.
Our proposals are based on thre guiding principles. First, the system does not need more
detailed regulation, which sooner or later will be circumvented, but a sweeping simplifi-
cation, which allows a more informed participation in the process by all actors involved.
Second, the system must have a center of gravity that can internalize the macroeconomic
constraints and can take responsibility for the whole process; in other words, the process
must be made more authoritarian, especially in times of fiscal emergency. Third, the em-
phasis must be shifted from regulation and ex-post controls to incentives, at all stages of
the preparation, presentation, discussion and especially implementation of the budget.
Our main proposals can be summarized as follows:
1) The number of documents and stages of the budget process should be reduced drasti-
cally, to three. First, a document presenting the trends of fiscal policy in the absence of
interventions and the scenarios corrsponding to alternative policy interventions. Second,
the Budget containing the fiscal manoeuvre. Third, a mid-year budget.
2) Economic planning should play no role in the budget process;
3) In the executive, all budget issues should be the prerogative of the Treasury minister,
who would also have veto power on spending ministers. The powers of the Treasury minis-
ter whould be strengthened when the debt/GDP ratio is high. The Budget and the Finance
ministers should be abolished.
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